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Abstract 
 
Many Internet markets rely on ‘feedback systems’, essentially social networks of reputation, 
to facilitate trust and trustworthiness in anonymous transactions. Market competition creates 
incentives that arguably may enhance or curb the effectiveness of these systems. We 
investigate how different forms of market competition and social reputation networks interact 
in a series of laboratory online markets, where sellers face a moral hazard. We find that 
competition in strangers networks (where market encounters are one-shot) most frequently 
enhances trust and trustworthiness, and always increases total gains-from-trade. One reason is 
that information about reputation trumps pricing in the sense that traders usually do not 
conduct business with someone having a bad reputation not even for a substantial price 
discount. We also find that a reliable reputation network can largely reduce the advantage of 
partners networks (where a buyer and a seller can maintain repeated exchange with each 
other) in promoting trust and trustworthiness if the market is sufficiently competitive. We 
conclude that, overall, competitive online markets have more effective social reputation 
networks. 
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This paper presents evidence on the relationship between market competition and the social 
networks used in many Internet markets to induce trusting and trustworthy behavior.  Well 
functioning markets, be they Internet or brick-and-mortar, must strike a delicate balance between 
competition and cooperation. On the one hand, competition on factors such as price is a main 
driver of the social and business benefits associated with trade. On the other hand, these benefits 
can be realized only if traders cooperate by making good on the agreement (e.g., delivering the 
product as promised). It is on this latter score that social networks have proven critical (e.g., 
Dellarocas 2003, Gefen and Straub 2004).  
All markets are embedded in social networks, and these networks facilitate the dissemination of 
information about reputations. Reputation information permits members, market traders in this 
instance, to implement cooperation through tit-for-tat strategies, bypassing what is often 
prohibitively costly legal action (e.g., Alexander 1987, Granovetter 1985).
1 In this way, social 
networks encourage trust and trustworthiness among traders.  
The great advantage of Internet markets is that they enable traders to break through geographical 
constraints to trade in larger and more competitive pools (e.g., Malone et al. 1987; Granados et al. 
2006). The social networks around Internet markets are structured differently than those around 
most brick-and-mortar markets. In brick-and-mortar markets, there tends to be more repeated 
exchange between traders with a partners relationship. Tit-for-tat here relies on a direct flow of 
reputation information; e.g., the buyer does business with the seller only if the seller has been 
reliable with the buyer in the past. Partnering to create trust and trustworthiness is known to 
work well even when there is little legal safety net (e.g., McMillan 2002). In Internet markets, 
transactions tend to be more one-shot, between strangers. For instance, Resnick and Zeckhauser 
(2002) found that 89 percent of all eBay trading encounters are one-shot. Tit-for-tat here relies 
on an indirect flow of reputation information; the buyer does business with the seller only if the 
seller has been reliable with third party buyers. To facilitate this strategy, many Internet markets 
                                                 
1  Or as Cornelius Vanderbilt put it to a former business associate he had a falling out with, “I won’t sue you, for 
the law is too slow. I’ll ruin you.” (Kaplan 2006, p. 137).  
  1(e.g., Amazon, Cnet, eBay, Half, and Yahoo) have formal ‘feedback systems’, allowing traders 
to post evaluations of those they exchange with for the benefit of other traders.
2
In this paper, we examine laboratory versions of anonymous online markets where sellers face a 
moral hazard concerning trustworthiness - whether to ship to a trusting buyer or not. Market 
participants are presented with a series of trading opportunities, across a number of rounds. The 
market encounters are linked over time via social reputation networks: Prospective buyers are 
furnished with feedback information, a complete and accurate record of a seller’s past shipping 
record within the market community.
3 The information flow allows buyers to better decide 
whether they should trust the seller by making a buy, and by the same token creates incentives 
for sellers to be trustworthy. In our laboratory study, we mainly focus on ‘strangers network’ 
versions of the market, with indirect flows of reputation information as in many online markets. 
But following Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels (2004a), we also investigate ‘partners network’ 
versions of the market, as a way to benchmark the stranger network results. Because the amount 
of information that buyers have about the shipping history of sellers they are matched with is the 
same in both strangers and partners networks, economic theory implies that trading patterns 
should be independent of the kind of network. In essence, with the same information, buyers can 
implement the same tit-for-tat strategy (for the theory see Kreps et al. 1982; Bolton and 
Ockenfels 2006).  The theory is independent of the amount of competition in the market.  Bolton 
et al. (2004a) studied markets where there was little competition
4 and found that, contrary to 
reputation building theory, the volume of completed trade was substantially higher in the 
partners networks than in the strangers networks. 
Reputation building behavior in both field and lab data is ‘noisier’ than what is implied by the 
theoretical reputation building models: Sellers sometimes fail to ship when building up a 
reputation of being trustworthy would have been the rational strategy, and they do not always 
defect when profit-maximizing dictates so. As a result, the predictive value of reputation 
                                                 
2  Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000), Dellarocas (2003), and Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) provide comparisons of 
electronic and conventional dissemination of reputation information. There is a large literature showing that 
reputation mechanisms like those employed by eBay have merit, although reputation information is less than 
fully reliable. In particular, field data and experimental work indicate that reputable Internet sellers are more 
likely to sell their items (e.g., Resnick, Zeckhauser 2002), and can expect price premiums (e.g., Lucking-Reiley 
et al. 1999); see Resnick et al. (2002), Dellarocas (forthcoming), and Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels (2004b) for 
discussions and surveys. 
3  Hence our experiment looks at the performance of feedback systems under ideal conditions.  
4   The study examined markets in which trading encounters were exogenously arranged, and the price of any 
transaction was fixed. 
  2information differs in theory and practice. As a simple example, the fact that a seller failed to 
ship once in the past, does not mean, with probability one, that he will never ship again, as the 
equilibrium of the model would suggest. Hence reputation information, even when it is a 
complete and reliable history, is more a noisy signal than reputation building models typically 
anticipate. But when the predictive value of reputation information is low or not clear, it is 
difficult for buyers to deal with these signals in a rational way, which adds to the noise in actual 
reputation building.  
Thinking of reputation building in terms of signaling suggests an alternative conceptual 
framework, one where competition plays a central role. The economic theory of signaling 
suggests that, in principle, the combination of seller competition and noisy signals can lead to 
one of two very different types of outcomes (Riley 2001, Spence 1974, Cho and Kreps 1987). On 
the one hand, seller competition permits buyers to discriminate on the basis of seller signals. To 
the extent they do so, sellers have an incentive to invest in a good signal. In terms of the markets 
we study in this paper, sellers would have an incentive to maintain a reputation for 
trustworthiness because buyers reward trustworthiness with trust; the end result is a higher 
volume of transactions making for greater market efficiency. On the other hand, if buyers do not 
or only weakly discriminate on the basis of the reputation signal, sellers have little incentive to 
invest in greater trustworthiness. Competition, then, would have little merit, or, at the extreme, it 
could lead to a lemons problem (Akerlof 1970), where all sellers are basically treated the same 
by buyers. Competition may lead to sellers becoming less trustworthy, chasing out buying, 
thereby reducing the volume of trade. Thus, in principle, market competition may increase the 
effectiveness of social reputation networks to promote trust and trustworthiness – but it also 
might leave it unchanged or even reduce the efficiency of the market.  
The experiment we present in this paper begins by examining strangers and partners networks 
with no competition. The partners network leads to higher levels of market efficiency than does 
the strangers network. This reproduces the main result of Bolton et al. (2004), and we take this 
result as a baseline for the rest of the experiment. We then introduce matching competition (each 
buyer gets to choose between two sellers; prices are fixed) and price competition (the two sellers 
compete on prices) to both the strangers and partners networks.  The two kinds of competition, 
matching and price, plausibly have countervailing effects.  In markets with matching competition, 
sellers can only attract buyers on the basis of reputation information, and this competitive focus 
  3on competition may plausibly lead to more trustworthiness and larger gains-from-trade. Markets 
with price competition permit buyers to trade-off pricing and reputation in their seller selection 
(i.e., to take a chance on a seller with a less reputation but also a lower price), which weakens the 
focuse on reputation, and this might plausibly destabilize trade.  
 
2 Experimental  Design 
2.1 Buyer-Seller  Game 
Our laboratory study centers on a simple buyer-seller game that captures the essence of moral 
hazard problems as they are present on any Internet market. We conceive of market transactions 
as taking place over a fixed number of rounds. At the beginning of each round, a potential buyer 
is matched (either exogenously or through selection by the buyer) with a seller. The ensuing 
encounter is laid out in Figure 1.  
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not ship ship
not buy buy
Buyer's Choice
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Seller earns
50
50
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35
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70
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Figure 1. The Base Buyer-Seller Game with No Competition 
 
The buyer chooses whether to purchase an item (in Figure 1, at a fixed price) or not. If not, both 
sides of the market receive a status quo payoff. If the purchase order is sent, the seller decides 
whether to ship or simply keep the buyer’s money. The moral hazard is that, on receiving the 
money from the buyer, the seller has no immediate pecuniary incentive to ship the item. So a 
transaction that is in the interest of both parties may be thwarted either because the seller proves 
untrustworthy, or because the buyer, given this risk, chooses not to trust.  
  4In the game in Figure 1, both the seller and the buyer are endowed with 35 (hence the payoff if 
no trade takes place). The seller offers an item for sale at a fixed price of 35 which has a value of 
50 to the buyer. The seller’s cost of providing the buyer with the item − costs associated with 
executing the trade, shipping, handling etc., as well as production costs − is 20.
5 So each 
successfully completed trade increases efficiency by creating a consumer surplus of 15 and a net 
profit of 15 for the seller. If the buyer chooses to buy the item, he sends his endowment of 35 to 
the seller, who then has to decide whether to ship the item. If the seller does not ship, he receives 
the price plus his endowment of 35 for a total of 70. If he ships, he receives the price minus the 
costs plus his endowment for a total of 50. If the buyer chooses not to buy the item, no trade 
occurs.  
The experimental market is embedded in a social network of the market’s trader population, 
which provides buyers with information about a seller’s past behavior. That is, prior to choosing, 
the buyer is informed what choice (ship or not ship) the seller has made in each of the prior 
rounds he was given a chance to do so. In economics, reputation building theory indicates that 
this information is sufficient to induce reputation building over the course of the market. More 
specifically, Kreps and Wilson (1982) developed a (now standard) reputation building model 
applicable to our setting. The model supposes at the beginning of round 1 of the market that each 
buyer believes that a certain proportion of the sellers is intrinsically honest (that is, that they will 
ship even though the pecuniary incentive goes contrary to this decision). One of the hallmarks of 
the model is that this probability may be very small.
6 When a seller ships early in the market, this 
causes buyers to increase their assessment that the seller belongs to the honest sellers, and this, in 
turn, makes it more likely that the seller will be able to do business in the future. Alternatively, if 
the seller fails to ship, buyers can see the seller’s dishonesty and no one will do business with the 
seller in the future. Hence, even sellers who are not intrinsically honest have an incentive to build 
a reputation for honesty. This incentive system insures successful trades (buyer buys, seller 
                                                 
5  These are production costs where either the seller produces the item after he knows the demand, or the product 
is produced before the buyer’s decision is known but costs are not sunk (e.g., when the item can be resold at a 
price equal to production costs). 
6  There is plenty of laboratory and field evidence that a non-negligible share of subjects and traders are, in fact, 
trustworthy and driven by social preferences (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton 
et al. 2004b). Models that assume that it is common knowledge that all players are motivated only by their 
pecuniary interests, on the other hand, can support reputation building only if the market horizon is infinite (that 
is, there is no round maximum to player participation). One of the things that the models discussed in the text 
show, however, is that this restriction on reputation building activity is highly sensitive to the common 
knowledge assumption about motivation. 
  5ships) at least until the last few rounds in the market, when there is no longer sufficient future 
incentive for sellers who are intrinsically honest to continue shipping. In reputation building 
theory, whether the interaction pattern in the market is of the stranger sort (one-shot trade) or the 
partner sort (long term relationships) does not matter. As long as buyers can see the history of the 
seller they are matched with prior to trade, reputation building should be independent of whether 
that information was supplied by a third party interaction (strangers network) or by first party 
interaction (partners network).
7 That is, in theory, reputation building is about information – not 
the pattern of social interaction. 
 
2.2 Treatments   
We examine six different treatments, each associated with specific market institutions (see Table 
1). The treatments can be organized along two dimensions. The first is network: partners and 
strangers network. While in markets with partners networks, a buyer can maintain a cooperative 
relationship with a single seller, buyers and sellers in strangers networks interact at most once. 
The second dimension is competition: no competition, matching competition, and price 
competition. While in markets with no competition, buyers have no choice with whom they are 
matched with, competition involves buyers choosing between two sellers on the basis of 
reputation information only (matching competition), or on the basis of reputation information 
and price offers by sellers (price competition). Our treatments combine each of the two networks 
with each of the three competition forms, yielding six treatments in total. 
 
Table 1. The Six Treatments 
Competition Network 
  Strangers   Partners  
No   Strangers market with no 
competition 
Partners market with no 
competition 
Matching   Strangers market with 
matching competition 
Partners market with 
matching competition 
Price   Strangers market with price 
competition  
Partners market with price 
competition 
                                                 
7  This statement holds as long as the information is equally reliable and complete across matching schemes. 
While this is not necessarily the case outside the laboratory, the experiments allow us to cleanly separate the 
impact of matching schemes and information content. 
  6 
The two treatments with no competition look at the strangers versus partners result exhibited in 
Bolton et al. (2004a) in a slightly different market context.
8 At the beginning of the laboratory 
session, participants are assigned to buyer and seller roles, with an equal number in each role. 
The roles are fixed for the entire session. Traders interface by computer. Each round, a buyer and 
seller are matched to play the game as illustrated in Figure 1. A seller’s history of actions - ship, 
no ship, or no buy - is recorded for each round within a market. The entire history within the 
market is displayed to the buyer with whom the seller is matched. Participants interact in a 
sequence of two separate markets of 15 rounds each. Upon completion of the first market, all 
reputation scores are deleted and traders start another market with blank records and identical 
market rules. Comparing behavior in the first and second market allows us to identify learning 
trends.  
When the market is embedded in a strangers network, no buyer-seller pair interacted more than 
once (within this constraint, matches were random). In partners networks, the same buyer and 
seller are matched together for the duration of the entire market (but are randomly re-matched 
after the first and before the second market within a session). In both cases, the matching 
procedure is public information.  
 
To investigate the impact of matching competition, we modify the basic game from Figure 1 to 
allow the buyer to choose between two sellers in each round on the basis of reputation histories 
(as before, the buyer can also choose not to buy at all in the round; see Figure 2). 
 
                                                 
8   In particular, the design of the experiment in Bolton et al. (2004a) had participants rotate between buyer and 
seller roles. Here we fix roles. Data from the present experiment will show that the stranger-partner gap 
identified in the earlier study is robust to this feature.  
  7Selected Seller's Choice 35
35
35
0
70
35
not ship ship
not buy select a seller and buy
Buyer's Choice
Buyer earns
Selected seller earns
Other seller earns
50
50
35
Selected Seller's Choice 35
35
35
0
70
35
not ship ship
not buy select a seller and buy
Buyer's Choice
Buyer earns
Selected seller earns
Other seller earns
50
50
35
Figure 2. The Buyer-Seller Game with Matching Competition 
 
In the partners network, after the first round, the buyer chooses between the seller he last bought 
from and a new seller he was not previously matched with. So the buyer can always choose to 
maintain a longer relationship with a seller; but in each new market period, he can also switch to 
match a new seller. Matching competition in the partners network does not necessarily imply a 
partners relationship, but it gives buyers the opportunity to build one. 
In the corresponding strangers network, however, partner relationships cannot be developed. 
Here, after the first round, the buyer chooses between the seller he was last matched with but did 
not buy from and a new seller he was not previously matched with. So buyers cannot do repeated 
business with the same seller; they always have to choose between two sellers they have not 
selected previously. In all sessions for these two treatments with matching competition, two 
thirds of the participants are assigned roles as sellers and one-third assigned to be buyers. 
Otherwise the set-up and procedures for these treatments are the same as for the ones without 
matching competition. 
 
To investigate the impact of price competition in strangers and partners networks, we follow the 
same procedure as above but now also allow sellers to post a selling price prior to the buyer 
choosing between them, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: The Buyer-Seller Game with Price Competition 
 
Sellers are free to set a price anywhere in the range from 0 to 100. As a result, a buyer can 
choose between two sellers (or not to buy at all) on the basis of both reputation and price 
information. Price competition always allows buyers to select sellers according to their 
reputation profiles, as in matching competition, but adds price as an additional dimension of the 
competition. Otherwise the set-up and procedures for these treatments are the same as for those 
with matching competition. 
 
2.3 Laboratory  Protocol 
In all, 216 subjects participated in the experiment. There were 36 subjects in each treatment. No 
subject participated in more than one treatment. The written instructions given to participants, 
reproduced in the Appendix, describe the protocol for the experiment in detail. In brief, subjects 
were students, mostly undergraduates, from various fields of study who volunteered through an 
on-line recruitment system. Cash was the only incentive to participate. Upon arrival at the 
laboratory, participants were seated at the computers, separated by partitions. They were then 
asked to read the instructions. When subjects finished reading, the experimenter read the 
instructions out loud in order to enter them into public knowledge. To familiarize them with the 
software, subjects played several practice games, sometimes as buyer sometimes as seller, with 
the computer in the opposite role making its moves at random. (The Appendix includes a sample 
of screen shots.) 
  9Once familiar with the interface, subjects played a sequence of two markets, both of the same 
treatment condition, and subjects taking the same role in both markets but trading encounters re-
randomized. Payoffs were listed in laboratory ‘francs’ in the quantities given in Figures 1-3; the 
francs exchange rate of $0.02 per franc was presented to the subjects in the instructions. Upon 
completion of the session, one of the two markets played by each subject was chosen at random, 
and each subject was privately paid his or her earnings for that market in cash plus a $5 show-up 
fee. Total earnings per subject ranged from $5 to $20 with an average of $15.80. 
 
 
3  Data Analysis: Market Efficiency and Trading Patterns 
Subjects within each treatment engaged in a sequence of two markets (section 2.3), but there is 
no evidence of a statistically significant learning trends across the two. For this reason, in the 
following analysis, we do not distinguish between the first and second markets in each session 
but aggregate the data. 
 
3.1 Gains-from-Trade 
Figure 4 displays the efficiency of the markets in terms of the realized percentage of the 
maximum achievable gains-from-trade (= total payoff achieved if all possible transactions are 
successfully completed minus the amount achieved if there are no buys) for each of the six 
treatments. The gains are further broken down to amounts received by sellers and by buyers, as a 
percentage of the total gains possible per trader.  
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Figure 4. Gains from Trade as a Percentage of Potential Total Gains, 
by Type of Competition and Network 
 
Table 2 provides the corresponding inferential statistics using Tobit regression analysis. Tobit 
estimation accounts for the censored nature of the data. There is no cross effects variable for 
PRICE and MATCH because, the the experiment’s design, the former is nested in the latter.  For 
our data, the estimated coefficients are equal to the marginal effects of the individual 
independent variables.
9  
 
                                                 
9   The nonparametric Mann Whitney test, applied pair-wise to treatments, yields results comparable to those 
presented in Tables 2 and 4. The main advantage of the Tobit analysis is economy of exposition. For a detailed 
discussion of Tobit regression see, for example, Davidson and MacKinnon (1993).  
  11Table 2. Gains-from-Trade (Proportion of Maximum Possible) 
Tobit regression estimates (and standard errors) 
VARIABLES 
Independent \ Dependent 
TOTAL
a 
GAINS 
BUYER 
GAINS 
SELLER  
GAINS 
CONSTANT 
 = gains in strangers no competition market. 
0.576*** 
(.0248) 
0.095*** 
(.0239) 
0.435*** 
(.0434) 
MATCH 
 = 1 if either match or price competition market, and 0 else. 
0.237*** 
(.0392) 
0.146*** 
(.0373) 
0.073 
(.0574) 
PRICE 
 = 1 if price competition market, and 0 else. 
-0.035 
(.0429) 
0.060 
(.0407) 
-0.126*** 
(.0531) 
PARTNERS 
 = 1 if partner network, and 0 else. 
0.216*** 
(.0351) 
0.183*** 
(.0335) 
0.034 
(.0614) 
PARTNERS x MATCH 
 = cross effects variable. 
-0.162*** 
(.0554) 
-0.107 
(.0527) 
-0.047 
(.0813) 
PARTNERS x PRICE 
 = cross effects variable. 
-0.091 
(.0607) 
-.071 
(.0575) 
0.028
  
(.0753) 
Number of observations 
Log-likelihood 
84 
69.97 
84  
66.14 
132 
28.52 
a 
Total gains tabulated by buyer. Regressing on data tabulated by seller yields similar results. Total gains in table differ 
slightly from buyer plus seller gains because buyer gains are tabulated by buyer, while seller gains are tabulated by seller. 
*** Significant at .025 level, two-tailed. 
** Significant at .05 level, two-tailed. 
* Significant at .10 level, two-tailed. 
 
There are three main observations to take from Figure 4 and Table 2: 
(1) In strangers markets, the introduction of competition increases the total gains-from-trade, 
with buyers primarily receiving the gains and sellers losing from price competition. 
Relative to the stranger market without competition, the introduction of matching competition 
significantly increases total gains-from-trade by 41% (=0.237/0.576). The further addition of 
price competition dampens these gains only by a small, insignificant amount. The total gains 
from price competition are significantly greater than for no competition (Wald test, two-tailed  p 
< 0.001). The gains primarily go to buyers, the significant portion representing a 154% 
(=0.146/0.095) increase over no competition. Sellers are not hurt by matching competition but 
lose significant surplus from price competition, -29% (=-0.126/0.435). (Later, we will show that 
the average price sellers receive in price competitive markets is lower than what they receive in 
the fixed price markets, explaining this decrease.)  
(2) Relative to strangers markets, in the partners markets the total gains-from-trade from 
matching competition are smaller, and they are erased by the addition of price competition. 
The total gain from adding matching competition is just .075 (=0.237-0.162) but nevertheless 
weakly significant (Wald, two-tailed p = 0.056). There is no significant difference, however, for 
  12total gains-from-trade in no competition and price competition markets (Wald, two-tailed p = 
0.195). It is clear that buyers gain from both matching and price competition while sellers lose 
(see Table 2). So, unlike strangers markets, competition in partners markets leaves total 
efficiency little changed, but like strangers markets, it redistributes trade surplus from sellers to 
buyers. 
(3) The efficiency-enhancing effect of partners networks is strongly reduced by competition. 
Absent any competition, the total gains-from-trade in partners markets are 38% (=0.216/0.576) 
more efficient than in strangers markets (the coefficient of the PARTNERS variable shows the 
difference to be highly significant). The result can neither be explained by differences in the 
communication channel between traders (e.g., Daft, Lengel 1986; Dellarocas 2005; Rice 1992; 
Brosig et al. 2002), nor by the distances or anonymity between traders (Granovetter 1973), since 
these were kept constant across treatments. When we add matching competition, however, the 
total gains-from-trade in partners networks are only 5% (=0.216-0.162) higher than in strangers 
networks, but not significantly so (Wald test, two-tailed p = 0.207). When we add price 
competition, the difference completely disappears (Wald test, two-tailed p = 0.393). Hence 
competition erases the gap observed between non-competitive strangers and partners networks. 
Table 3 explains why the difference vanishes: In the partners market with no competition, it is 
not possible for the buyer to switch away from his assigned seller partner. In competitive markets, 
the buyer can, and does switch – in about every fifth case under matching competition, and more 
than double this under price competition. So, with competition, (voluntary) partners networks 
look more and more like strangers networks. 
 
Table 3. Buyer Choice Patterns in Partners Networks with Competition 
 
Frequency with which buyers 
switch seller partners when 
given the opportunity (%) 
Frequency buyers buy from a 
seller when given the 
opportunity (%) 
Matching competition   19  92 
Price Competition  42  87 
 
The next sub-section will make the point that the underlying changes in trust and trustworthy 
behaviors are the drivers for the fluctuations in gains-from-trade across treatments. 
 
  133.2  Trust and Trustworthiness in Trading 
Figure 5 shows the frequency with which buyers trust their sellers across the rounds of the 
market. Figure 6 displays the frequency, conditional on receiving a buy, with which sellers are 
trustworthy and ship across the rounds of the market. 
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Figure 5. Trust: Buy Decisions (Frequency by Round) 
 
 
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
13579 1 1 1 3 1 5
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
13579 1 1 1 3 1
Strangers Partners
Round Round
No
Competition
5
Matching
Competition
Price
Competition
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00 1.00
13579 1 1 1 3 1 5
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
13579 1 1 1 3 1
Strangers Partners
Round Round
No
Competition
5
Matching
Competition
Price
Competition
No
Competition
No
Competition
Matching
Competition
Matching
Competition
Price
Competition
Price
Competition
 
  14Figure 6. Trustworthiness: Ship Decisions - Conditional on Buying (Frequency by Round) 
 
Notice in both Figures 5 and 6, the steep drop in buying and shipping in the final rounds of the 
markets. The consistency and magnitude of this behavior are striking evidence of the strategic 
nature of trader behavior in these markets: Sellers build reputation for profit; at the end of the 
market, a good reputation is no longer useful and so they stop. Likewise, buyers largely 
anticipate this behavior, and in this sense they too are behaving strategically. Table 4 shows the 
Tobit analysis for the data in Figures 5 and 6.  
 
Table 4. Frequency of Trusting and Trustworthy Behavior 
Tobit regression estimates (and standard errors) 
VARIABLES 
Independent \ Dependent  BUY SHIPP
a
CONSTANT 
 = frequency in strangers no competition market. 
0.702*** 
(.0233) 
0.754*** 
(.0548) 
MATCH 
 = 1 if either match or price competition market, and 0 else. 
0.198*** 
(.0368) 
0.155** 
(.0733) 
PRICE 
 = 1 if price competition market, and 0 else. 
0.008 
(.0403) 
-0.117* 
(.0681) 
PARTNERS 
 = 1 if partner network, and 0 else. 
0.154*** 
(.0330) 
0.177*** 
(.0775) 
PARTNERS x MATCH 
 = cross effects variable. 
-0.112** 
(.0528) 
-0.259*** 
(.1039) 
PARTNERS x PRICE 
 = cross effects variable. 
-0.078 
(.0578) 
0.074 
(.0964) 
Number of observations 
Log-likelihood 
84 
63.86 
132  
-17.86 
a 
Frequency conditional on buying. 
*** Significant at .025 level, two-tailed. 
** Significant at .05 level, two-tailed. 
* Significant at .10 level, two-tailed. 
 
There are two main observations to be made: 
(1) In strangers markets, matching competition increases both trust and trustworthiness. The 
addition of price competition leaves trust unchanged, but diminishes trustworthiness. 
Matching competition significantly raises trust by 28% (=0.198/0.702) and trustworthiness by 
21% (=0.155/0.754). An important implication of the latter observation is that competition not 
only allows buyers to evade untrustworthy sellers, but also tends to lift the trustworthiness of all 
sellers relative to the market without competition. The addition of price competition, however, 
eliminates much of this gain in trustworthiness. Apparently, buyer trust remains high in price 
  15competitive markets because buyers are able to evade untrustworthy sellers. The movements in 
trust and trustworthiness explain the increase in efficiency when competition is introduced to 
strangers markets (as observed in section 3.1). 
(2) Competition erases the advantage in trust and trustworthy behavior that partners networks 
have over strangers networks in markets without competition.  
The statement is true for both matching and price competition: With regard to Table 4, neither 
the hypothesis that the PARTNERS coefficient plus the first cross effect variable are equal to 
zero, nor the hypothesis that the PARTNERS coefficient plus both cross effect variables are 
equal to 0 can be rejected for either buyer behavior (Wald, two-tailed p = 0.303 and 0.387, 
respectively) or seller behavior (Wald, two-tailed p = 0.235 and 0.905, respectively). These 
changes in trust and trustworthiness explain why efficiency does not rise when competition is 
introduced into partners markets as observed in section 3.1. They also explain why efficiency in 
both matching and price competitive markets does not differ across strangers and partners 
networks. 
 
3.3  The Impact of Price Competition 
Looking at the trading encounter with price competition in Figure 2 in isolation and abstracting 
away from the reputation network, a seller should only ship at prices above 70. This is the seller 
profit from not shipping to a trusting buyer. But price offers above 70 will be rejected because 
they imply buyer payoffs below 30, while the buyer’s outside option from not buying is 35. So, 
no trade can occur.  However, as in the other markets, the social reputation network allows 
sellers to signal trustworthiness and at the same time to offer acceptable prices. The markets in 
the other treatments fixed the price at 50.  
If buyers trade-off pricing and reputation information, sellers may have an incentive to undercut 
the competitor’s price in order to be chosen by the buyer. As a result, there would be a 
downward pressure on prices. Reduced prices, however, create increased incentives not to ship, 
because the profit from shipping (=100 minus price; Figure 3) is negatively correlated with price 
whereas the profit from not shipping is fixed at 70. To the extent buyers are price-sensitive and 
are willing to trade-off reputation scores and price-offers, trade may be destabilized.  
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Figure 7 shows the average prices per round across the two price competition markets. The 
average chosen price across all rounds was 43 for the strangers market and 44.7 for the partners 
market. Average prices across strangers and partners networks are almost identical. The only 
difference to be observed in Figure 7, is that it takes longer for the strangers network to settle 
down. Save for this difference, pricing behavior is the same in strangers and partners networks.  
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Figure 7. Price Movements with Price Competition 
 
On average, prices in both markets are well above the competitive value of 35 (= marginal cost). 
If buyers chose primarily on price, we would expect the price to more closely reflect the fully 
competitive benchmark, or at least tend in this direction over time. But higher prices are rather 
stable over time.  
Finally, as seen in Figure 7, once trading reputations have been established, in later market 
rounds, price is not much of an indicator of selection; the lines for chosen and rejected prices 
cross several times. This all suggests that reputation information – not price – determines seller 
selection. 
Table 5 strengthens the view that reputation information trumps pricing. It indicates that, for the 
most part, buyer choice is lexicographic. Most selections of sellers are consistent with buyers 
  17looking first at reputation, and if there is a difference, they select on this basis. If there is no 
difference in reputation, then and only then, do they select based on price.
10
 
Table 5. Buyer Choice Frequencies in Games with Price Competition 
 
Number of Ships 
Seller Reputation measured as  
Number of Buys 
 
STRANGERS 
NETWORK 
 
Seller chosen 
has a better 
reputation  
… worse …  … same …  Sum 
Seller chosen offers a 
better price  0.214 0.113 0.168  0.495 
… worse …  0.287  0.012  0.153  0.453 
… same …  0.018  0.003  0.031  0.052 
Sum  0.520 0.128 0.352  1.000 
       
       
PARTNERS 
NETWORK 
Seller chosen 
has a better 
reputation 
… worse …  … same …  Sum 
Seller chosen offers 
better price  0.166 0.019 0.166  0.351 
… worse …  0.265  0.089  0.220  0.575 
… same …  0.032  0.006  0.035  0.073 
Sum  0.463 0.115 0.422  1.000 
 
 
4  Summary and Discussion  
Many Internet markets with anonymous trading implement social reputation networks to combat 
moral hazard problems. This paper investigates with the help of a laboratory experiment whether 
and how competition affects trading patterns and reputation building in such online markets. Our 
most important finding is that, when we restrict ourselves to strangers networks, the kind of 
networks which are predominant in large Internet markets, competition increases the 
                                                 
10   While a quick read of the Table 5 would suggest that there is no clear tendency to choose the better price when 
the feedback score is the same, keep in mind that no single measure of reputation is likely to capture how every 
person judges the better reputation; for example, some people may weight recent seller behavior differently than 
earlier behavior - and people who do so may use different weighting schemes. Hence, what looks like 
indifference in the table, may not look precisely like that to everyone. That said, the basic results reported here 
are robust to other simple measures of reputation, such as the measure ‘number of ships minus number of no 
ships’, patterned after eBay’s feedback number.  
  18effectiveness of the electronic reputation mechanism in promoting trust and trustworthiness in 
trading.  
In strangers markets, matching competition (sellers compete on reputation) yields significantly 
higher levels of buyer trust, seller trustworthiness and market efficiency compared to markets 
without any competition. The reason is that buyers can discriminate between sellers on the basis 
of the reputation information provided by the network, creating stronger incentives for sellers to 
be trustworthy. Price competition (sellers compete on reputation and prices) also does better than 
markets without any seller competition. Yet, the reason for the improvement is, ironically, that 
sellers do not engage in strong price competition. Price competition leaves sellers with less 
incentive to be trustworthy, the lower prices meaning lower gains from maintaining a good 
reputation. In fact, because there is some weak price competition, sellers are slightly less 
trustworthy compared to seller behavior with matching competition. This causes a negative, 
though not significant effect on the profitability and efficiency of trade. In this sense, price 
competition tends to undermine the merits of electronic feedback systems.  
The reason that price competition is weak in these markets is that reputation information trumps 
pricing in buyer deliberations concerning which seller to do business with. That is, buyers 
usually do not do business with someone with a bad reputation even for a substantial price break. 
As a result, the downward pressure on prices is moderate, and average price offers are very 
stable over time.  As a result, price competition is only a small threat - in strangers markets - to 
the increased trusting and trustworthy trading patterns observed with matching competition. 
Overall, the results imply that encouraging greater market competition may be a powerful tool 
for increasing trust and trustworthiness in Internet markets with reputation mechanisms.  
Somewhat surprisingly, we also observe that competition largely erases the difference in market 
performance previously observed in strangers and partners networks. With either matching or 
price competition, there is virtually no difference in market efficiency and distribution of gains-
from-trade in partners and strangers networks. This implies that, in our contexts, the opportunity 
to partner up with a seller for a longer bilateral relationship has only little value to traders in 
competitive markets. One might have expected just the opposite: that seller competition 
increases the value of stable, repeated bilateral exchange, e.g., because those sellers not chosen 
had no opportunity to prove their trustworthiness and thus have a smaller chance of being chosen 
in the future. In fact, however, buyers switch sellers quite often when given the chance. In price 
  19competition markets with partners networks, for instance, the probability that the previous round 
seller is chosen again is not much smaller than the probability that a new seller is selected. The 
important implication of this finding for online markets is that a reliable reputation network in a 
competitive market can largely reduce the advantage of partner networks in promoting trust and 
trustworthiness.  
While there is a large literature on the performance of reputation systems, there is as presently 
little field that complements the research here on competition and social networks. Part of the 
reason is that complex ‘naturally occurring’ field environments make it hard, if not impossible, 
to isolate the impact of competition in different kinds of social networks.  In this regard, our 
findings of the subtle interplay between the working of the social reputation network and pricing 
system may help future field studies.  For example, our study illuminates the subtle interplay 
between reputation information and pricing, and shows how both are important factors for 
analysis: On the one hand, reputation information trumps pricing in buyer decisions; on the other 
hand, pricing is an important variable in seller trustworthiness.    
Finally, while the economic theory of reputation building yields important insights that guide our 
study, it does not illuminate the role competition plays in our findings. Instead, the basic intuition 
for our results, indeed for doing the experiment in the first place, comes from the market 
signaling literature.  Presently there is little research to illuminate the connections between these 
two bodies of work.  Our results suggest that a more thorough investigation of these links could 
be very fruitful for a deeper understanding of reputation building in general and for Internet 
markets in particular. 
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  22Appendix: Laboratory Materials 
A.1  Written instructions given to subjects The instructions for the endogenous matching with 
price competition, strangers market are reprinted with changes made for other treatments in 
[brackets]. 
 
General. The purpose of this session is to study how people make decisions. If at any time you have questions, raise 
your hand and a monitor will happily assist you. From now until the end of the session, unauthorized 
communication of any nature with other participants is prohibited.  
 
During the session you will participate in a market that gives you an opportunity to earn ‘francs’. At the end of the 
session, your earnings in francs will be translated to US dollars, according to the rules stated below. You will be 
paid these earnings plus a $5 show-up fee. The decisions and payments you make will be treated as confidential. 
 
Description of the game. You and the other participants in the room (but not the monitors) are the traders in the 
market. At the beginning of the market, you will be assigned to be either a Buyer or a Seller, and you will keep this 
role for the entire session.  
 
 
  not buy 
           35 
           35 
           35 
Buyer’s choice 
Selected seller’s choice 
ship        not ship
select a seller 
and buy 
                Buyer earns   100-P                        0
 Selected seller earns     P                             70 
     Other seller earns    35                            35                   
Sellers’ choice 
 
    prices (P’s) 
 
 
The market proceeds in a series of rounds. Each round, each buyer is matched with two sellers to trade a (fictional) 
commodity.  
 
At the beginning of the round, each Seller privately chooses a price in the range 0 to 100 francs. The Buyer sees 
these prices and then chooses to either select a seller and buy or not buy. If the Buyer chooses not buy, then there is 
no trade, and Buyer and both Sellers are paid 35 francs each. If the Buyer chooses to select a seller and buy, then the 
selected Seller makes a decision to ship or not ship. Ship pays the Buyer 100-P and the selected Seller P francs, 
where P is the price the selected Seller chose at the beginning of the round. Not ship pays the Buyer nothing and the 
selected Seller 70 francs. In all cases, the Other Seller, the one that was not selected, is paid 35 francs. [For non-
price competition treatments, the figure above was replaced with Figure 1 of the text, and the paragraph read: At 
the beginning of the round, the Buyer chooses to either select a seller and buy or not buy. If the Buyer chooses not 
buy, then there is no trade, and Buyer and both Sellers are paid 35 francs each. If the Buyer chooses to select a seller 
and buy, then the selected Seller makes a decision to ship or not ship. Ship pays Buyer and the selected Seller 50 
francs each while not ship pays the Buyer nothing and the selected Seller 70 francs; in either case, the Other Seller, 
the one that was not selected, is paid 35 francs.] 
 
The market will last for 15 rounds.  
 
In each round, the buyer is matched with the ‘Previous Seller’ and a ‘New Seller’. The Previous Seller is a seller the 
buyer was matched with in the previous round but did not buy from. The New Seller is a seller that the buyer was 
  23not matched with in the previous round. In round 1, both sellers are New Sellers (if neither is chosen then one is 
arbitrarily designated the Previous Seller in the succeeding round). [For exogenous stranger markets this passage 
read: You will never be matched with the same trading partner for more than one round. For exogenous partner 
markets: You will be matched with the same trading partner every round. For endogenous partners: In each round, 
the buyer is matched with the ‘Previous Seller’ and a ‘New Seller’. The Previous Seller is the last seller the buyer 
chose to buy from in previous rounds. The New Seller is a seller that the buyer was not matched with in the previous 
round. In round 1, both sellers are New Sellers (if neither is chosen then one is arbitrarily designated the Previous 
Seller in the succeeding round).] All partner pairings are anonymous: Your identity will not be revealed to the 
person you are playing with either before, during or after the game. 
 
Seller’s feedback history. For each round, the computer will record whether selected Sellers chose ship or not ship 
(if the Seller did not get to decide, the computer records nothing). This feedback will then be made available to all 
future Buyers that are matched with this Seller. The feedback will include a summary of the number of times the 
Seller shipped in the past, as well as a round-by-round history of their shipping decisions, beginning with the most 
recent decision. Buyers will see this feedback history prior to making their buy decision.  
 
Number of markets. You will participate in two markets, each with 15 rounds, one market played after the other. 
You will have the same role, buyer or seller, in both markets. But the order in which you interact with trading 
partners will be different in the second market than in the first. Information about seller decisions in the first market 
will not be available to participants during the second market.  
 
Money earnings. You will be paid your earnings for one market. The market to be paid will be selected by a random 
draw of a card at the end of the session. Each market has an equal chance of being selected, so you should do the 
best you can in both markets. The laboratory francs you earn for the selected market will be exchanged at a rate of 
$0.02 per franc. You will be paid the resulting sum plus a $5 show-up fee in cash.  
 
Practice games. When the monitor gives the OK, play some practice games. Your partner for the practice games 
will be the computer. It has been programmed to choose its moves at random. The practice games will allow you to 
experience the game from both the Buyer and Seller’s perspective. Practice until you feel comfortable with the game 
and its rules. Information about your decisions will not be used or displayed to other participants during the actual 
markets. 
 
Consent Forms. If you wish to participate in this study, please read and sign the accompanying consent form. The 
consent form explains your rights as a subject as well as the rules of confidentiality that will be adhered to regarding 
your participation. 
  24A.2  Screen shots Typical computer screens for both buyers and sellers in the endogenous matching with 
price competition, strangers market. 
Sellers 
 
Buyers 
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